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Abstract
This paper examines whether investors’ valuations of cash and share-put warrants are influenced by their
potential differential effect on firm solvency. It is motivated by the enactment of SFAS 150, which
requires that all contingent put warrant obligations be classified as balance sheet liabilities regardless of
put type. Consistent with the critics of SFAS150, we show that market participants differentially value
cash and share-puts based on their solvency characteristics beyond the firm’s recorded assets and
liabilities. Our results add to existing capital structure literature by suggesting that complex financial
instruments (such as cash and share-puts) be reported separately from each other on a firm’s balance
sheet.

1 Introduction
This paper examines whether investors’ valuations of put warrants (“puts”) that contain cash-only
settlement terms (“cash-puts”) and those that also allow for share-settlement (“share-puts”) are
consistent with the same balance sheet classification. The alternative that we investigate is whether
those valuations are influenced by the potential differential affect that each put type has on firm
solvency. Findings supporting this alternative imply that it might be misleading to investors to
group both financial instruments together on the balance sheet. This study is motivated by a change
in accounting rule enacted as a part of Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 150
(“SFAS 150”) Accounting for Certain Financial Instruments with Characteristics of Both
Liabilities and Equity that requires issuers to characterize both cash and share-puts as balance sheet
liabilities (FASB 2003a). Under the prior rules, both the International Accounting Standards Board
(IASB) and Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) characterized cash-puts as liabilities
and share-puts as equity. This prior characterization allowed share-put issuers to avoid balance
sheet classification of the contingent put obligation due to its potential differential effect on firm
solvency and equity value.
The new classification scheme is consistent with the expanded definition of what constitutes a
liability recommended by the FASB in the Exposure Draft entitled Proposed Amendment to FASB
Concepts Statement No. 6 to Revise the Definition of Liabilities (“PSFAC 6”) (FASB 2001). It is
based on the belief that financial instruments that allow for share-settlement establish relationships
that have little, if anything, in common with ownership interests since the instrument holder cannot
benefit from increases or suffer from decreases in the fair value of common equity. Rather, they
are considered to be similar in nature to cash-based obligations because both establish a debtorcreditor relationship between issuer and holder. Penman (2003) identifies the need for this change
in classification and indicates that the previous classification criteria follow an entity view of the
firm by focusing on the impact that cash-based obligations have on a firm’s own assets. He favors
a proprietorship view that classifies share-settled obligations as liabilities because they may also
impose a cost in the form of a transfer of shareholder wealth from equity-holders to third parties.
Critics of the change in classification of share-puts to liabilities, such as the American Accounting
Association’s Financial Accounting Standard’s Committee (AAA Committee), argue that the new
standard’s classification criteria creates a narrow definition of equity and a broad (and
meaningless) definition of liabilities by requiring financial instruments that contain heterogeneous
characteristics (such as cash and share-puts) to be classified as an undifferentiated set of liabilities.
The AAA Committee expresses concern that this may make financial statements less rather than
more relevant to users and hamper key decisions, particularly the assessment of solvency and
estimation of equity value (AAAFAS 2001, p. 3). They recommend that obligations that restrict
settlement to a firm’s assets (such as cash-puts) be disclosed separately from obligations that also
allow for settlement with a firm’s own common equity (such as share-puts), either as subdivisions
of liabilities and or through the creation of a well-defined mezzanine category in addition to
liabilities and equity in rank order based on their differential effect on firm solvency (AAAFAS
2001, p. 4). In response to these and other concerns raised by critics of SFAS 150, the FASB
recently announced its intention to reconsider the appropriate balance sheet classification of

multiple component financial instruments (such as put warrants) in the second Milestone Draft to
SFAS 150. The willingness of the FASB to further address and reconsider the prior decisions
reached in SFAS 150 indicates a continuing uncertainty within the accounting profession as to the
proper accounting treatment of these financial instruments.
We provide insight into this controversy by examining whether market participants value cash and
share-puts as heterogeneous financial instruments based on their potential differential effect on
firm solvency and equity valuation. Our sample consists of 156 firm-year observations for 52 firms
that issued puts and have conditional put obligations outstanding at year-end between 1991 and
2003. Restricting our sample to the pre-SFAS 150-time-period allows us to examine whether
solvency considerations differentially influenced investor valuation of put types without also
having to consider the impact of the change in accounting rules. We conduct between-firm tests to
investigate differences in characteristics of firms that issue cash or share puts. We also conduct
fixed-effects regression tests to examine whether investors differentially value cash and share-puts
beyond the firm’s recorded assets and liabilities. If investors believe that the cash and share-puts
are distinct financial instruments based on their potential differential impact of firm solvency, we
expect that they will value as cash-puts similar to other liabilities (negatively) but share-puts
similar to financial instruments that have the potential to positively impact firm value.
Our results show that share-put issuers have larger share repurchase and put programs than cashput issuers. The net-share settlement feature allows these firms to increase put sales by providing
them payment flexibility in the event operating cash flows are not sufficient to meet future put
obligations. This allows issuers to reduce the average cost of their current-year share repurchases
by an average of 7.4% (as compared to an average reduction of 3.9% for cash-put firms).
Consistent with the critics of SFAS 150, we find that market participants’ value cash and shareputs differentially beyond the firm’s recorded assets and liabilities. Cash-puts are valued similarly
to other liabilities (negatively) that require payment out of a firm’s own assets, while share-puts
are valued as financing instruments that have a potential positive impact on a firm solvency
regardless of whether they are exercised by put-holders or allowed to expire. We also show that
this result is due to solvency considerations rather than the accounting rule differences between
cash and share-puts. Our paper contributes to the capital structure literature (e.g. Warner 1977;
Myers 1977) by showing that solvency considerations are important factors in the valuation of
alternative put-types. Our results suggest that complex financing instruments (such as cash and
share-puts) be reported separately from each other on a firm’s balance sheet, consistent with the
AAA Committee position.
The remainder of the paper is divided into six additional sections. Section 2 discusses the
institutional features of put warrants and their impact on firm solvency and equity holdings. The
hypothesis is developed in Sect. 3 while the sample selection process is discussed in Sect. 4.
Section 5 presents the research design while the results of our statistical tests are presented in Sect.
6. Our conclusion is provided in Sect. 7.
2 Put warrants: firm solvency and equity holdings

Companies began selling puts to third parties in 1991 following a Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) ruling in favor of a Chicago Board of Options Exchange request to allow
such sales. Puts provide investors (“put-holders”) the right to require the issuer to purchase their
own common equity at a pre-defined price (“strike price”) and date (“settlement date”). In return,
the issuer receives an up-front tax-free cash premium. Put contracts may be settled using a variety
of methods usually at the option of the issuer. The alternative settlement methods include:
•

Physical delivery: The company purchases its own stock from the put-holder for cash in an
amount equal to the put strike price.

•

Net-cash: The company pays to the put-holder cash in an amount equal to the loss realized
on the put contract. No shares are exchanged.

•

Net-share: The company pays to the put-holder its own stock with a fair value equal to the
loss realized on the put contract.

In the past, firms have issued two different put types: cash and share-puts. Cash puts require the
issuer to settle the put obligation by transferring their own assets (using physical delivery or netcash) while “share-puts” also permit issuers (at their choice) to use the net-share method to settle
the put contract. The resulting effect of put issuance on firm solvency and common equity holdings
is demonstrated by the following example. As shown in Exhibit 1, the impact is dependent upon
the initial put sale proceeds received (A), the relationship between the fair value of the underlying
common equity (FMV) and put strike price (S), and, finally, if and how the puts are settled. Case
I describes the situation where the puts are “out-of-the money” at the settlement date because the
fair value of common equity exceeds the put strike price (FMV > S). In this instance, the putholders “lose” because they are better off by allowing the puts to expire. This allows the firm to
experience an incremental increase in solvency equal to the put sales proceeds received (+A).
Cases II–IV assume that the puts are “in-the-money” at the settlement date. In this instance, the
firm incurs an incremental loss on put issuance because they are required to purchase their own
common equity from put-holders at the higher put strike price (rather than lower common equity
FMV, or S-FMV). The impact on firm solvency and equity holdings depends on how the put
obligation is settled. Case II assumes the “physical delivery” method is utilized. Firm solvency is
reduced in an amount equal to the difference between cash paid for the stock and the put sales
proceeds received, or −S + A. Equity holdings, however, increase by the shares repurchased (+C).
Case III assumes the firm settles the put contract using the “net-cash” method. In this instance, the
firm pays the put-holder cash in an amount equal to the incremental loss realized on the put
transaction (LOSSCASH). After considering the put sales proceeds received, the incremental
effect to firm solvency is negative in an amount equal to −LOSSCASH + A. There is no
incremental impact to equity holdings since no shares are exchanged between the issuer and putholder. Finally, Case IV assumes the firm uses the “net-share” method to settle the put contract.
Similar to the net-cash method, the issuer does not repurchase their common equity from the putholder. Rather, they issue their common equity to put-holders with a fair value equal to the
incremental loss realized on the put contract. Consequently, the resulting dilution in equity
holdings is equal to the number of common shares issued to put-holders (-LOSSSTOCK). Similar

to Case I, firm solvency increases incrementally in an amount equal to the put sales proceeds
received (+A).
Exhibit 1
Summary of the economic effect of issuing put warrantsa
Condition Solvency effect Equity effect
Case I

FMV > S +A

Case II FMV < S −S+A

None
+C

Case III FMV < S −LOSSCASH+A None
Case IV FMV < S +A

−LOSSSTOCK

a

The purpose of this table is to summarize the effect of put issuance on firm solvency (solvency
effect) and common equity holdings (equity effect)
Variable definitions: FMV equals the fair market value of the firm’s common equity. S equals the
put strike price. A equals the cash proceeds received when the puts are sold. C represents the
common shares repurchased by the firm (assuming physical delivery). LOSSCASH represents the
cash paid to put-holders assuming the put contract is settled using the net-cash option.
LOSSSTOCK represents the common shares issued to put-holders assuming the put contract is
settled using the net-share settlement option
3 Hypothesis
The new classification scheme under SFAS 150 requiring balance sheet classification of
contingent put obligations regardless of put type is based on the belief that certain share-settled
obligations (such as share-puts) establish relationships that have little, if anything, in common with
ownership interests since the instrument holder receives a variable number of shares and cannot
benefit from increases or suffer from decreases in the fair value of common equity. Rather, they
are considered to be similar in nature to cash-based obligations (such as cash-puts) because both
establish a debtor-creditor relationship between issuer and holder based on the potential dilution
of stockholder wealth through the transfer of a variable number of equity shares to third parties in
settlement of the put obligation.
This view contrasts with current capital structure theory that has primarily taken a solvency
perspective towards defining debt, based on two characteristics possessed by most debt
instruments: a future claim on firm assets and legal enforceability. The first characteristic is
articulated in Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 6 (“SFAC 6”) Elements of
Financial Statements which defines a liability as (FASB 1985, p. 18): “probable future sacrifices
of future economic benefits arising from present obligations of a particular entity to transfer assets
or provide services to other entities in the future as a result of past transactions or events.” The
second characteristic of legal enforceability is advanced by Cheng et al. (2003) who state that page

22): “financial theory suggests that a primary characteristic of debt is that creditors have the option
to force a delinquent debtor into bankruptcy.” These complimentary views suggest that investors
are likely to value cash and share-puts based on their potential differential effects on firm solvency.
Cash-puts are likely to be viewed as liabilities because they negatively impact firm solvency and
put-holders can force a delinquent issuer into bankruptcy for non-payment of the cash obligation.
In contrast, share-puts will not be valued as equivalent financial instruments because they have the
potential to positively affect firm solvency and creditors cannot force a delinquent issuer into
bankruptcy (due to the availability of the net-share settlement method to the issuer). Whether the
market assesses cash and share-puts as heterogeneous or homogeneous financial instruments based
on their potential differential effect of firm solvency and equity valuation is an empirical issue.
We test the validity of these contrasting positions by examining the following hypothesis (stated
in the alternative form)
H1A:
The market values both cash and share-puts based on their differential effects on a firm’s solvency
in the Pre-FAS 150 period.
The null hypothesis is that the market values both cash and share-puts similarly (as liabilities) due
to their establishment of a “debtor-creditor” relationship between issuer and put-holder and the
contingent loss faced by the firm and its shareholders, either in terms of firm solvency or
shareholder dilution.
4 Sample selection
Our sample consists of U.S. corporations that had outstanding contingent put obligations at yearend between 1991 and 2003. We utilize the pre-SFAS 150 time period because it allows us to
examine the impact, if any, of solvency considerations on an investor’s valuation of put types
without also having to consider the effect of the change in accounting rules. Table 1 outlines our
sample selection procedure. Using the NAARS and MERGENT databases, we identify 174 firmyear observations of put issuances in the time period under consideration. We eliminated six firmyear observations that issued puts during the year but did not have contingent put obligations
outstanding at year-end (either because the puts expired or were settled by the firm prior to the
financial statement date). We also eliminated 12 firm-year observations with insufficient financial
statement and/or price data to compute our test variables. This selection criterion yields a sample
of 156 firm-year observations for 52 firms. The sample represents an unbalanced panel since each
firm has observations in different years and for a varying number of years. Firms issued puts on
average for 3.2 years. Fifteen firms issued puts for only one year, while thirty-seven firms issued
puts in multiple years, ranging from two to nine years. Most firms issued either cash or share-puts
over the life of their put programs. However, five firms began their put program by issuing cashputs in the early years of their put program and then switched to share-puts in its latter years, while
two other firms began their put programs by issuing share-puts and then switched to cash-puts.
Consequently, 74 firm-year observations consist of firms with contingent cash-put obligations
(cash-put firms) while 82 firm-year observations represent firms with contingent share put
obligations (share-put firms).

Table 1
Sample selection method
Firm-Years Percentage
Initial Samplea

174

100.00

Less: Firm-years with no puts outstanding at year-endb −6

−3.45

Less: Firm-years with insufficient financial/price datac −12

−6.90

Full Sample

89.65

156

a

We use the MERGENT and NAARS database to identify firms that issued put warrants between 1991 and 2003. Of
the 156 firm-year observations, 74 relate to cash-put issuances (cash-put firms) and 82 relate to share-put issuances
(share-put firms)
b

Six firm-year observations were eliminated because the firm’s put warrants were not outstanding as of their year-end
financial statement date
c

Twelve firm-year observations were eliminated because they did not have sufficient financial statement or price data
to compute our test statistics

As shown in Table 2, Panel A, prior to 1996 (and the enactment of IAS 32) the utilization of put
warrants as a financing instrument was primarily limited to cash-put firms (15 of 17 firm-year
observations, or 88.2%). Put warrant usage increased dramatically during the 1996–2003 time
period with the relative percentage of share-put firm-year observations comprising slightly over
half of the total firm-year observations for this period (80 of 139 firm-year observations, or 57.5%).
As shown in Panel B, most sample observations are associated in the manufacturing (SIC Codes
2000/3000), wholesale/retail (SIC Code 5000) and service (SIC Code 7000) industries. Though
firms in the wholesale/retail industry issue primarily cash-puts and service firms issue primarily
share-puts, the total number of sample observations from these two SIC classifications only
comprise 31% of total firm-year observations. None of the other industries show a strong
preference for choosing cash or share-puts. We conclude that industry affiliation does not appear
to provide a strong motivation for issuing cash or share-puts.

Table 2
Sample description
Variable

Full samplea Cash-put firmsa Share-put firmsa

Panel A: Period outstanding
1991–1995 17

15

2

1996–2003 139

59

80

Panel B: SIC codesb
1000’s

4

0

4

2000’s

44

24

20

3000’s

42

19

23

4000’s

7

5

2

5000’s

21

18

3

6000’s

6

2

4

7000’s

30

5

25

8000’s

2

1

1

a

The sample consists 156 put-obligation firm years. 74 observations represent obligations related to cash-puts. 82
observations represent obligations related to share-puts
b

Represent one-digit SIC Code Classifications. 1000’s: Mining and construction. 2000’s: Manufacturing: paper,
chemical, and allied products. 3000’s: Manufacturing: machinery and electronic equipment. 4000’s: Transportation:
communication, utilities. 5000’s: Wholesale and retail trade. 6000’s: Finance, insurance and real estate. 7000’s:
Services: business. 8000’s: Services: health

5 Research design
We use a fixed-effects regression to exploit the time-series information in the data set by relating
the variation in market capitalization firm “i” over the sample period in year “t” to any
corresponding variations in the financial statement explanatory variables. We investigate whether
puts are reflected in share prices of issuers using the following relation:

Model 1
MVi,t=ϕ0+β1BVi,t+β2TSi,t+β3LSi,t+β4PUTi,t+αi
MV represents the share price at year-end. BV is the book value of the firm’s assets at year-end.
TS measures the amount of recorded year-end treasury stock and is included as an explanatory
variable since prior research shows that firms which repurchase their own shares experience a
permanent increase in stock price (Vermaelen 1981; Ikenberry and Vermaelen 1996). LS
represents the book value of total liabilities (excluding contingent put obligations). PUT represents
each firm’s contingent put obligation. It is calculated as the product of the total number of put
warrants outstanding at the balance sheet date multiplied by the strike price associated with each
put (assuming physical delivery). This measurement treatment is found in SFAS 150 which states
(p. 13): “[I]f either the amount to be paid or the settlement date varies based on specified
conditions, those instruments shall be measured subsequently at the amount of cash that they would
be paid under the conditions specified in the contract if settlement occurred at the reporting date.”
Similar to previous research, all variables are scaled by each firm’s number of shares outstanding
for each firm-year. Different forms of this model have been widely used in the accounting literature
(i.e., Barth 1991; Barth and McNichols 1994; Henning et al. 2000). Estimation of this model
assumes that, for firms with only assets and liabilities in their capital structures, the book value
amounts equal the amounts implicit in share prices and there are no omitted variables so that the
coefficients for total assets (BV) and liabilities (LS) will equal one and minus one and the intercept
will equal zero. Neither condition is likely to hold since accounting data are measured with error
and omitted variables can result in estimated coefficients that differ from their theoretical values.
Thus, we limit our formal predictions about the estimated coefficients to their signs. Consistent
with Henning et al. (2000), BV and TS are predicted to have positive estimated coefficients while
LS is expected to have a negative estimated coefficient. If all puts are valued as liabilities as SFAS
150 calls for, we predict that the sign of the estimated coefficient of PUT will be negative.
Next, we examine whether investors’ differentially value cash and share-puts based on their
potential solvency characteristics beyond the firm’s recorded assets and liabilities using the
following relation:
Model 2
MVi,t=ϕ0+β1BVi,t+β2TSi,t+β3LSi,t+β5CPUTi,t + β6SPUTi,t+αi
MV, BV, TS and LS are defined as before. CPUT and SPUT represent the contingent put
obligations associated with cash and share-puts, respectively. CPUT is defined as the product of
PUT and a dummy variable which equals 1 if the put is a cash-put and zero otherwise. SPUT is
defined as the product of PUT and a dummy variable which equals 1 if the put contract is a shareput and zero otherwise. We predict that the estimated coefficient of CPUT will be negative if
investors value cash-put obligations similarly to other balance sheet liabilities. We predict that the
estimated coefficient of SPUT positive if investors believe that share-puts have the potential to
increase firm solvency.

It is possible, however, that any result that we obtain in the previous test may be attributable to
accounting rule rather than solvency considerations. Hopkins (1996) shows that analysts take
certain attributes for granted when instruments are classified as either liabilities or equity on a
firm’s balance sheet. This suggests that the market’s valuation of puts under the prior GAAP rules
may have been influenced by the divergent accounting rules afforded to cash and share-puts. For
example, investors were likely to value cash-puts as liabilities and share puts as equity based on
their required classification under IAS 32 and EITF 96-13. While both prior capital structure and
accounting research predict that investors will differentially value cash and share puts, a
determination of whether their assessment is ultimately influenced by solvency or accounting
considerations is an empirical issue. We test for this distinction using the following relation:
Model 3
MVi,t=ϕ0+β1BVi,t+β2TSi,t+β3LSi,t+β7ICPUTi,t + β8OCPUTi,t+β9ISPUTi,t + β10OSPUTi
,t + αi
This model attempts to distinguish between these two explanations by examining whether the
market’s valuation of cash or share puts varies based on whether the financial instrument is “in”
or “out” of-the-money at the balance sheet date. Again, MV, BV, TS and LS are defined as before.
ICPUT and ISPUT represent cash (share) puts that are “in-the-money” at year-end. ICPUT
(ISPUT) is defined as CPUT (SPUT) multiplied by a dummy variable that equals 1 if the puts are
“in-the-money” as of the balance sheet date and zero otherwise. Finally, OCPUT and OSPUT
represent cash (share) puts that are “out-the-money” at year-end. OCPUT (OSPUT) is defined as
CPUT (SPUT) multiplied by a dummy variable that equals 1 if the puts are “out-of-the-money” as
of the balance sheet date and zero otherwise. If investors value put obligations based on their
accounting characteristics, they will continue to value cash-puts as liabilities (negatively) and
share-puts as financing instruments that have the potential to increase firm solvency (positively).
If, however, market participants base their valuation of put obligations on solvency considerations,
they will only value “in-the-money” cash-puts as liabilities due to their expected negative future
impact on firm solvency. We do not, however, expect that the market’s valuation of share-puts to
change since in either instance they have the potential to increase firm solvency regardless of
whether they are exercised by put-holders or allowed to expire.
6 Empirical results
6.1 Descriptive statistics
Financial characteristics for the sample group are provided in Table 3, column 1. As shown in
Panel A, put issuances are associated with firms that are in good financial condition (average
current ratio is 2.00, debt ratio is 0.23 and z-score is 8.04). We also find that put issuers are
profitable on a pre-tax basis (average pre-tax ROA is 15%) in the year of put issuance and have
high explicit marginal tax rates (average effective tax rate is 39%). Consistent with the expectation
that firms will issue puts in periods of rising share prices (Gibson et al. 2004), the sample firms
have significant market-to-book ratios averaging 9.59. We also find that most put issuers (154 of
156 firm-year observations or 50 sample firms) are engaged in significant stock repurchase
programs with an average firm-year cumulative treasury stock ratio of 17% of total assets and a

current year stock repurchase ratio of 9% of total assets. Selling puts allowed issuers to collect, on
average, $88 million of tax-free proceeds per firm, which allowed them to reduce the cost of their
share repurchase program by 5.8% (Panel B). This created, however, a conditional firm-year put
obligation averaging 6.9% of year-end total assets. If this obligation was to be settled entirely with
cash (assuming physical delivery), it would consume approximately 68% of each firm’s current
year operating cash flows.
Table 3
Descriptive statistics
Variable

Full samplea Cash-put firmsa Share-put firmsa

Panel A: Firm characteristics
Assets

$8,636

$7,498

$9,663

Current ratio

2.00

2.01

2.17

Debt ratio

0.23

0.26

0.19**

ROA

0.15

0.11

0.19**

Effective tax rate

0.39

0.37

0.39

Treasury stock ratio 0.17

0.10

0.23*

Repurchase ratio

0.09

0.06

0.13*

MV/BV

9.59

4.96

13.78**

Growth

0.21

0.21

0.22

Volatility

0.42

0.39

0.44

Z-Score

8.04

6.50

9.44**

$88

$66

$106

Put obligation ratio 0.07

0.03

0.10*

Put flexibility ratio 0.68

0.25

1.07*

Panel B: Put characteristics
Put proceeds

*, **, *** Mean difference between amounts for cash and share put firms is significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level
of significance, respectively. All tests are two-tailed

a

The sample consists 156 put-obligation firm years. 74 firm-year observations represent firms that had outstanding
cash-puts. 82 observations represent firms that had outstanding share-puts

Variable definitions: Assets: total assets at year-end (millions). Current ratio: current assets scaled
by current liabilities. Debt ratio: sum of current plus long-term debt (excluding put obligations)
scaled by total assets. ROA: pre-tax income scaled by average assets for the year. Effective tax
rate: Tax expense (per books) scaled by pre-tax income. Treasury stock ratio: total treasury stock
scaled by year-end assets. Repurchase ratio: cost of shares repurchased during the year scaled by
year-end assets. Growth: Percentage change in total assets for the year. Volatility: Average
volatility of common equity for the year. Z-Score: average z-score for each sample firm for the
year. Put proceeds: total put proceeds received during the period that they sold put warrants to
third parties (in millions). Put obligation ratio: Year-end contingent put obligation scaled by total
assets. Put flexibility ratio: contingent put obligation scaled by operating cash flows for the year
Financial characteristics for the cash and share-put firm-year sub-samples are presented in columns
2 and 3. As shown in Panel A, we do not find a significant difference in the size of firms that issue
cash or share puts. The average size of share-put firms (in terms of total assets) is $9,663 million
as compared to $7,498 million for cash-put firms. This mean difference is not significant at the
usual levels. Cash-put firms have higher debt ratios than share-put firms (0.26 vs. 0.19 of total
assets). On the other hand, share-put firms are more profitable, have higher market-to-book ratios,
and z-scores than cash-put firms.
We also show that share-put firms have larger share repurchase and put programs than cash-put
firms. Share-put firms have higher average treasury stock ratios (23% to 10% of total assets) and
current-year share repurchase ratios (13% to 6% of total assets) than cash-put firms. As shown in
Panel B, share-put firms collected more cash proceeds from the sale of puts per firm than cash-put
firms ($107 million vs. $66 million). This allowed them to reduce the cost of their current share
repurchases by 7%, as opposed to only 4% for cash-put firms. The increased put activity causes
share-put firms to have a significantly higher conditional put obligation exposure (averaging 10%
of total assets) than cash-put firms (averaging 3% of total assets). However, when these obligations
are considered along each firm’s pre-existing debt obligations, the relative level of overall liability
exposure (debt plus conditional put obligations) of cash and share-put firms is virtually identical.
This suggests that cash-put issuers may have been precluded from selling more puts because of
debt capacity constraints. Finally, share-put firms would face tighter cash constraints than cashput firms if the entire conditional put obligation were to be settled with cash (using physical
delivery). This is because their current year conditional put obligation to operating cash flow ratio
is significantly higher than the similar ratio for cash-put firms (1.07 vs. 0.25). This latter result
suggests that share-put firms may have used the share-settlement feature to provide themselves
payment flexibility in the event that future cash flows were not sufficient to pay put obligations at
the settlement date.
6.2 Valuation model test results
The fixed-effects valuation regression results are presented in Table 4. The results for Model 1 are
presented in Column 2. The model’s overall R 2 is 0.13 (“within” R 2 within is 0.17 and “between”
R 2 is 0.08). Consistent with expectations, the signs of the estimated coefficients on BV and LS are

in the predicted directions and significant at the 0.01 level (one-tailed). On the other hand, the
estimated coefficient of TS is not significant at the usual levels. We also find a positive association
between each firm’s put warrant obligation and its market value since the estimated coefficient of
PUT is positive and significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed). This finding is opposite to what we
expect if investors value all put warrants as liabilities, consistent with the accounting called for in
SFAS 150.
Table 4
Between-firm tests for sample of 156 firm-years using fixed-effect regression.
Model 1: MVi,t=ϕ0+β1BVi,t+β2TSi,t+β3LSi,t+β4PUTi,t+αi
Model 2: MVi,t=ϕ0+β1BVi,t+β2TSi,t+β3LSi,t+β5CPUTi,t + β6SPUTi,t+αi
Model 3:
MVi,t=ϕ0+β1BVi,t+β2TSi,t+β3LSi,t+β7ICPUTi,t + β8OCPUTi,t+β9ISPUTi,t + β10OSPUTi
,t + αi
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Est. Coef. SE

Est. Coef. SE

Est. Coef. SE

Intercept

11.74

4.34*

13.52

4.41*

12.12

4.49*

BV

1.81

0.51*

1.79

0.51*

1.85

0.51*

TS

0.42

0.35

0.41

0.34

0.41

0.35

LS

−1.59

0.64*

−1.53

0.63*

−1.55

0.62*

PUT

3.93

2.27***

CPUT

−15.09

10.76***

SPUT

4.12

2.25**

ICPUT

−16.95

12.25***

OCPUT

−12.25

12.09

ISPUT

3.06

2.33***

OSPUT

9.41

4.03*

Variable
N = 156

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Est. Coef. SE

Est. Coef. SE

Est. Coef. SE

0.17

0.19

0.21

R 2 between 0.08

0.13

0.13

R 2 overall 0.13

0.16

0.17

Variable
R 2 within

*, **, *** Significant at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 levels, respectively. All tests are one tailed
MV represents the year-end market value of common equity. BV represents total year-end assets.
TS is defined as total treasury stock at year-end. LS is defined as total liabilities at year-end
(excluding put obligations). PUT represents the contingent put obligations at year-end (assuming
physical delivery). CPUT represents the contingent put obligation associated with cash-puts at
year-end (assuming physical delivery). SPUT represents the contingent put obligation associated
with share-puts at year-end. ICPUT represents CPUT times a dummy variable that equals 1 if the
put warrant is “in-the-money” at year end and zero otherwise. OCPUT represents CPUT times a
dummy variable that equals one if put is “out-of-the-money” at year end and zero otherwise.
ISPUT represents SPUT times a dummy variable that equals 1 if the put warrant is “in-the-money”
at year end and zero otherwise. OSPUT represents SPUT times a dummy variable that equals one
if put is “out-of-the-money” at year end and zero otherwise. Amounts for MV, BV, TS, LS, PUT,
CPUT, SPUT, ICPUT, OCPUT, ISPUT and OSPUT are scaled by total common shares
outstanding at year-end
We examine whether investors distinguished between the differential effects that cash and shareputs have on firm value by separating the conditional put obligations between cash and share-puts
(Model 2). The model’s overall R2 increases to 0.16 (“within” R 2 is 0.19 and “between” R 2 is
0.13). Consistent with the results of Model 1, the signs of the estimated coefficients of BV and LS
are as predicted and significant. Consistent with H1A, we show that investors differentially value
cash and share-put obligations. Similar to other liabilities, the sign of the estimated coefficient of
CPUT is negative and significant at the 0.05-level (one-tailed). On the other hand, the sign of the
estimated coefficient of SPUT is positive and significant at the 0.10-level (one-tailed). We test
whether these results are driven by accounting rule or solvency considerations in Model 3. Again,
the model’s overall R 2 increases slightly to 0.17 (“within” R 2 within is 0.21 and “between” R 2 is
0.13). As expected, investors continue to value “in-the-money” puts as liabilities that will
negatively impact firm solvency as the sign of the estimated coefficient of ICPUT is negative and
significant at the 0.10 level (one-tailed). On the other hand, investors no longer value “out-of’money” puts as financial instruments that have the potential to negatively impact firm value (as
liabilities) as the estimated coefficient of OCPUT is no longer significant at the usual levels. This
result suggests that market participants’ value cash-puts based on their potential effects on firm
solvency rather than the fact that they are classified as balance sheet obligations. In contrast, the
signs of the estimated coefficients of ISPUT and OPSPUT are both positive and significant at the
0.10 and 0.01 levels of significance, respectively. This finding suggests that investors believe that

share-puts have the potential to incrementally increase firm solvency regardless of whether they
are allowed to expire worthless or settled by the issuer with a their own common equity.
6.3 Correlations
One concern about the interpretation of our results is that they may be unstable due to high
correlations between the explanatory variables. To address this issue we present correlation
coefficients for all three explanatory variables for each fixed regression model in Table 5. As
expected, we find that BV and LS are highly correlated in each model (Panel B). TS is weakly
correlated with both BS and LS. We re-run our fixed-effect regressions excluding TS from each
model (1, 2 and 3) without a significant change in results. We do not find significant correlations
between any of the other explanatory variable in each of our regression models.

Table 5
Correlation coefficients.
Model 1: MVi,t=ϕ0+β1BVi,t+β2TSi,t+β3LSi,t+β4PUTi,t+αi
Model 2: MVi,t=ϕ0+β1BVi,t+β2TSi,t+β3LSi,t+β5CPUTi,t + β6SPUTi,t+αi
Model 3:
MVi,t=ϕ0+β1BVi,t+β2TSi,t+β3LSi,t+β7ICPUTi,t + β8OCPUTi,t+β9ISPUTi,t + β10OSPUTi
,t + αi

Panel A: Model 1
BV

TS

LS

PUT

BV

1.00

TS

0.30 1.00

LS

0.97 0.36 1.00

PUT

−0.07 0.07 −0.07 1.00

Panel B: Model 2
BV

TS

LS

CPUT SPUT

BV

1.00

TS

0.30 1.00

LS

0.97 0.36 1.00

CPUT

0.21 0.13 0.16 1.00

SPUT

−0.16 0.02 −0.14 −0.27 1.00

Panel C: Model 3
BV

TS

LS

BV

1.00

TS

0.30 1.00

LS

0.97 0.36 1.00

ICPUT OCPUT ISPUT OSPUT

ICPUT 0.18 0.18 0.14 1.00
OCPUT 0.10 −0.06 0.07 −0.12 1.00
OSPUT −0.13 −0.08 −0.14 −0.12 0.14

1.00

OSPUT −0.07 0.17 −0.02 0.12

−0.14 1.00

−0.13

Explanatory variable definitions: BV represents total year-end assets. TS is defined as total
treasury stock at year-end. LS is defined as total liabilities at year-end (excluding put obligations).
PUT represents the contingent put obligation at year-end (assuming physical delivery). CPUT
represents the contingent put obligation associated with cash-puts at year-end (assuming physical
delivery). SPUT represents the contingent put obligation associated with share-puts at year-end.
ICPUT represents CPUT times a dummy variable that equals 1 if the put warrant is “in-the-money”
at year end and zero otherwise. OCPUT represents CPUT times a dummy variable that equals one
if put is “out-of-the-money” at year end and zero otherwise. ISPUT represents SPUT times a
dummy variable that equals 1 if the put warrant is “in-the-money” at year end and zero otherwise.
OSPUT represents SPUT times a dummy variable that equals one if put is “out-of-the-money” at
year end and zero otherwise. Amounts for BV, TS, LS, PUT, CPUT, SPUT, ICPUT, OCPUT,
ISPUT and OSPUT are scaled by total common shares outstanding at year-end
7 Conclusions
Prior research suggests firms issued puts either to signal favorable private information about future
earnings prospects to outside investors (Gibson et al. 2004) or to reduce financing costs (Gibson
and Singh 2005). Atanasov et al. (2004) assert that financial intermediaries purchase puts in order
to gain valuable private information about the issuer’s future operating performance in order to
trade on this information and generate additional profits. Conditional on the decision to issue puts,
this paper extends prior research by examining whether an investor’s valuation of cash and shareputs was impacted by their potential differential impact of firm solvency and equity valuation. We
find that market participants’ value cash and share-puts differentially beyond the firms recorded
assets and liabilities. We also show that this result is due to the solvency distinctions rather than
accounting rule differences between cash and share-puts. Our results suggest that dual purpose
financing instruments (such as cash and share-puts) be reported separately from each other on a
firm’s balance sheet, consistent with the AAA Committee position.
Put warrants were just one type of multiple component financing instrument that is covered by
SFAS 150. These include (but are not limited to) mandatory redeemable stock and other
obligations to repurchase stock, such as forward purchase agreements. Future research should
consider examining the impact of SFAS 150 on the firm’s choice and investors’ valuation of these
dual purpose financing instruments.
Appendix A
Firms issuing puts also included discussions of their put programs in the footnotes to their financial
statements. While the type of information disclosed varied greatly across firms, most put issuers
disclosed the time period that they began selling puts and the put settlement terms. In addition,
share-put issuers either disclosed their put obligation amount or the necessary information required
to allow the reader to independently determine this item (since cash-put issuers were required to
show their conditional put obligation as a balance sheet obligation they did not always disclose
this item in their footnotes). In many cases both cash and share-put issuers also included the
following additional information in their footnotes: number of put warrants issued and put
proceeds received, put warrant vesting period, put warrant strike price (or average strike price if

more than one set of put warrants had been issued), number of puts outstanding at year-end,
whether the outstanding puts were “in” or “out-of-the money” at year-end, and the put warrant
activity for the year (puts sold, exercised, net-cash settled, net-share settled, expired). These
additional disclosures, however, were not uniform across firms. In all cases, however, share-put
issuers either disclosed their put obligation amount or the necessary information required to allow
the reader to independently determine this item (since cash-put issuers were required to show their
conditional put obligation as a balance sheet obligation they did not always disclose this item in
their footnotes).
In this Appendix, we include two sample put warrant footnote disclosures. The first is from the
1997 financial statements of Symbol Technologies (cash-put issuer). The second is from the 2000
financial statements of Pall Corporation (share-put issuer). Each is shown below:
Cash-put issuer-sample footnote disclosure no. 1
Symbol Technologies (1997 Financial Statements (for the years ending December 31, 1997, 1996
and 1995); Discussion included the “Common Stock” footnote and included in the sub-section
entitled “Common Equity Put Options”):
During April 1997 the Company issued common equity put options on 150,000 shares of its
common stock which are exercisable for a period of one year from the date of issuance and give
independent parties the right to sell such shares to the Company at a strike price of $31.163 per
share. Proceeds of $285,000 from the issuance of the April 1997, put options were credited to
additional paid in capital.
The balance of the common equity put option account as of December 31, 1997 and December 31,
1996, represents the amount the Company would be obligated to pay if all unexpired put options
were exercised relating to unexpired transactions outstanding as of the respective balance sheet
dates. The decrease in the balance as of December 31, 1997 from December 31, 1996 is due to the
expiration of obligations associated with 70,500 shares and 375,000 shares, respectively of the
Company’s common stock at strike prices of $26.703 and $24.421, respectively, and
corresponding reclassification to additional paid in capital, partially offset by the April issuance
previously described.
Share-put issuer-sample footnote disclosure no. 2
Pall Corporation (2000 Financial Statements (for the fiscal years ending July 29, 2000, July 31,
1999 and August 1, 1998); Discussion included as a part of the “Common Stock” footnote and
included in the sub-section entitled: “Share Repurchases”):
In connection with the Company’s stock repurchase program, approximately 1,360 put options
with strike prices ranging from $21.40 to $22.75 were sold under three separate contracts with an
independent third party during fiscal 2000. The contracts grant the purchaser the right to sell shares
of Pall Corporation stock to the Company at specified future dates and prices. In the event the puts
are exercised, the contracts allow the Company to determine whether to settle in cash or shares.
As such, the contracts are considered equity instruments and changes in fair value are not
recognized in the Company’s financial statements. The premiums received of $2,049 were

recorded as additions to capital in excess of par value. Contracts related to approximately 920 put
options expired in fiscal 2000 unexercised. At July 29, 2000, one contract for approximately 440
put options, with a strike price of $22.75 and expiration date of September 25, 2000, is outstanding.
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Footnotes

SFAS 150 is effective for financial instruments entered into or modified after May 31, 2004 and
otherwise is effective at the beginning of the first interim period of any issuer after June 15,
2004.

Cash-puts were first classified as liabilities by the FASB in Emerging Issues Task Force Number
88–9 (“EITF 88-9”) Put Warrants (FASB 1988). See also Accounting Series Release Number
268 (SEC 1979). The accounting treatment for share-puts was first addressed by the IASB in
1996 with the issuance of International Accounting Standard 32 (“IAS 32”): Financial
Instruments: Disclosure and Presentation (IASB 1996). Consistent with IAS 32, the FASB
classified share-puts as equity instruments through the issuance of Emerging Issues Task Force
Number 96-13 (“EITF 96-13”): Accounting for Derivative Financial Instruments Indexed to, and
Potentially Settled In, a Company’s Own Stock (FASB 1996). Final consensus regarding the
proper accounting treatment for cash and share puts was reached by the FASB in November,
2000 through the issuance of Emerging Issues Task Force Number 00-19 (“EITF 00-19”):
Accounting for Derivative Financial Instruments Indexed to, and Potentially Settled by a
Company’s Own Stock) which confirmed the prior classification scheme of cash-puts as
liabilities and share-puts as equity (FASB 2000).

Most issuers recorded contingent cash-put obligations in the mezzanine section of their balance
sheet. In contrast, share-put issuers disclosed their contingent put obligation in the footnotes to
their financial statements. See Appendix A for a further discussion of put warrant footnote
disclosures provided by pre-SFAS 150 cash and share-put issuers.

Penman (2003) indicates that an expense arises when the firm’s stock price falls, giving rise to
the “contingent liability.” SFAS 150 does not recommend booking this expense.

The first milestone draft to SFAS 150 Summary and Background of Milestone Draft developed
principles for classifying single-component instruments based on the Ownership-Settlement
Approach (FASB 2003b). It was presented in a format similar to that of an Exposure Draft.
However, it does not address all of the matters that would be expected to be addressed in an
Exposure Draft, such as multiple-component instruments, earnings per share, disclosure,
transition and effective date. These matters are to be addressed in the Second Milestone Draft.

This favorable ruling is contained in an SEC No-Action Letter dated February 22, 1991 (SEC
1991).

The tax treatment of puts is governed under IRC Section 1032 which requires firms to exclude
put sale proceeds from gross income for income tax purposes.

This assumes that −LOSSCASH is greater than +A. If the incremental loss amount is less, then
the firm will experience a small increase to firm solvency. Assuming that the firm repurchases its
common equity from a third party in accordance with a previously announced share repurchase
program, the overall impact to firm solvency is the same as Case II (−LOSSCASH-FMV+A
(Case III) = −S+A (Case II)).

In addition, in 2003 the IASB amended IAS 32 to be consistent with SFAS 150 and currently
requires issuers to account for share-puts as liabilities. See paragraphs 11(b)(ii), and 21 of IAS
32 (IASB 2003).

See, for example, Myers (1977) and Warner (1977).

The NAARS and MERGENT databases are used as the primary sources for our search for two
reasons. First, they contain a large set of publicly traded companies including those traded on the
New York, American, and OTC stock exchanges. Second, they include firms involved in cash
and exchange offerings as well as public offerings and private placements. We use the NAARS
database as a source since it includes public filings through 1994. We use the MERGENT
database as our source to select post-1994 put issuances since it includes public filings from
1995 to the current date.

Most put contracts had vesting periods ranging from 3 months to 1 year.

Twenty-five of the thirty-seven put issuers had puts outstanding between two and four years.
Twelve firms had puts outstanding for periods ranging from 5 to 9 years.

These statistics are based on the information provided by 44 firms. Eight firms did not provide
put proceed information in their financial statements.

This benefit may come at a cost, however. Share-puts may carry an implicit cost either in the
form of a lower sales price or higher common equity strike price in order to gain investor

acceptance of the net-share settlement feature. This may partially explain why firms with less
significant put programs issued cash rather than share-puts.

Since cash puts are required to be valued as balance sheet liabilities in the pre-SFAS 150 period,
our results provide the surprising finding that investors are able to “see through” the required
liability accounting for these out of the money cash puts and not value them as liabilities when
the puts do not affect company solvency.

